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LXS^t\«/JLVf^L«^LVS/JL\f^U«/JtXS^LVS^ 



THE FUTURE of WARSAW 



REPRINT OF CHAPTER IV 
OF THE AUTHOR'S BOOK ON 

THE PROBLEMS of the COMING PEACE 



By FELIX MLYNARSKI, Ph. D. | 

Delegate of the Polish National Supreme Committee to America 



I 



NEW YORK 

POLISH BOOK IMPORTING CO., Inc. 

1916 



•)i^(ir/Wf«\ir?s\ir)ravirr4>(ir«viri«vir«^ 



THE PROBLEMS of the COMING PEACE 
CONTENTS: 

PAGE 

I. Introduction 9 

II. The Turkish Question 19 

III. The Part of Austria- Hungary ..... 57 

IV. The Future of Warsaw 91 

V. The Causes of the War 141 

VI. The Peace Tribunal 162 



Some other works of the Author : 

"Sociology and Epistemology" 

Jaroslav, 1910, 312 pp. 

"The Problem of the Policy of State Independence" 

(A Study in the Theory of Politics) 

Lemberg, 1911, 211 pp. 

"The Principles of Social Philosophy" 

Vol. I (in print) 



The Future of Warsaw 



By FELIX If^LYNARSKI, Pt. D. 

Delegate of the Polish National Supreme Committee to America 



REPRINT OF CHAPTER IV 
OF THE AUTHORS BOOK ON 

Tlie Problems of tne Coming Peace 



NEW YORK 

POLISH BOOK IMPORTING CO., Inc. 

1916 



^x^ 



Copyright, 1916 
By FELIX MLYNARSKI 



Gill 
} Auu lb 



3 — 



Chapter IV. — The Future of Warsaw 

The map of Europe contains a great political paradox. 
This paradox is the line of the Vistula, which is one 
of the main rivers of central Europe. Its upper part 
is in the hands of Austria-Hungary; the middle part 
in the hands of Russia and the lower part in those 
of Germany. On the upper part of the Vistula lies 
the town of Cracow where the old Polish Kings 
are buried; in the middle part of the Vistula is Warsaw, 
the capital of Poland, while Danzig, the old Polish harbor 
town, Hes at the mouth of the Vistula. It certainly is a 
paradox which shows geographically the political slavery of 
Poland. Cut in three parts, the Vistula is a river of slavery 
and the river of the great PoHsh suffering. 

The paradox of the Vistula is the strategical and eco- 
nomical expression of what Clemenceau has called "one of 
the biggest crimes in history."* 

The present war has been called a war fought for the 
liberty of nations. Ten millions of troops have been rushed 
into the valley of the Vistula, and from the Baltic Sea to the 
Carpathian Mountains there is one vast struggle going on, a 
struggle for which there is no comparison in history. The 
main issue in this enormous struggle is the fate of Warsaw, 
the capital of Poland. From the strategical point of view it 
is a question of the Vistula — from the political point of view 
it is a question of Poland's future. On the banks of the 
Vistula, justice is meted out for the partition of Poland and 



* "L'Honime Libre," August i6, 1914. 



— 4 — 

the three powers, which once upon a time dismembered 
Poland, are finally facing each other as enemies, arrayed 
for a final settlement. The Polish question which hitherto 
united them began to be a bone of contention; under the 
pressure of military necessity, both sides were compelled to 
approach the Polish nation, which ages ago settled on the 
banks of the Vistula and occupies the theatre of the present 
war. 

The time came for making promises. 

The proclamation which a year ago the German and the 
Austro-Hungarian armies distributed in Russian-Poland 
stated that the armies of these countries were bringing 
"Liberty and Independence"* to Poland. This was the first 
ray of hope for the Polish nation. A few days later an- 
other promise came, this time from the opposite party. On 
August 15, 1914, the late Russian Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolajevitch, proclaimed that the 
intention of Russia is to unite Poland under the sceptre of 
the Czar. ''Poland shall be reborn under this sceptre, free 
in faith, in language, in self-government." The armies of 
the western nations gave the hope of independence — the 
armies of the eastern power have limited the future of 
Poland to autonomy. The aforesaid proclamations, how- 
ever, were proclamations issued only by commanders-in- 
chief, and not by their respective governments. 

Poland knew long ago that the war would practically draw 
closer, and she prepared herself so as not to be surprised and 
to have a plan of action. During the war in the Balkans, 
Poland advanced her preparations considerably. Old and new 
organizations began secretly or openly to work with fewer in 
order to be able, in case of a war between Austria and 



' "Nowa Reforma," Cracow, August, 1914. 



Russia, to form their own military representation and throw 
it in the game and fight for Poland's independence. Out- 
wardly, Poland made her first political demonstration in 
European poHtics in the summer of 1913. PoHsh mihtary 
organizations and independence parties sent a delegation to 
London, where at that time a conference of ambassadors of 
European nations was in session, and it deposited with Sir 
Edward Grey and all the ambassadors assembled in con- 
ference a memorandum on the question of Poland. This 
memorandum was nothing else but a program of Poland's 
attitude in the war which at that time was already antici- 
pated. This memorandum called Europe's attention to the 
fact that in case of a war, Poland would throw her lot with 
Austria-Hungary against Russia because under present po- 
litical conditions such an action means the only real road 
to independence for Poland. The moment when the antici- 
pated war broke out Poland did not need to make her action 
dependent on any of the aforesaid proclamations which the 
armies of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia distributed 
all over Poland's territory. 

On August 5, 1914, the first Polish patrol composed of 
members of PoHsh mihtary organizations left Cracow and 
crossed Russia's frontier, headed for Kielce in Russian Po- 
land. This patrol was followed by other detachments num- 
bering several thousand of men. All of them were revolu- 
tionary troops trained in a military organization which for a 
good many years carried on the work openly in Galicia and 
under cover in Prussian and in Russian-Poland ; in these or- 
ganizations young men were trained for military purposes in 
order to be able to form, in case of war between Austria and 
Russia, a military representation of Poland. The plan 
elaborated long ago began to work. The frontier posts 
which for over a hundred years separated Cracow from 



Warsaw were pulled down ; they were pulled down by the 
Polish revolutionary soldiers who were the first to cross 
the frontier in order to bring liberty to Russian-Poland. 
This happened on August 5th — precisely fifty years after 
the Russian government in Warsaw, through the hangman's 
noose, executed the last five members of the last Polish 
National Government. This date of August 5th was a fes- 
tival and the day of the beginning of a new fight for inde- 
pendence. At the head of the movement stood Joseph 
Pitsudzki, a Russian subject. The road to Kielce was open 
for him because the Russian armies retreated for strategical 
reasons and the armies of Austria-Hungary had not arrived. 
Neither was there any proclamation from any of the warring 
powers. The action of the Poles outran the coming events. 
In Kielce, where for a while no other armies had made their 
appearance and which was occupied only by the Polish 
troops, the independence of Poland was proclaimed. The 
churches resounded with Polish national anthems for which 
hitherto Russian government deported the people to Siberia. 
PoHsh flags showing the historical White Eagle were once 
more floating over the city showing their white and crim- 
son colors to the eyes of the enthusiastic people. The ranks 
of the Polish revolutionary army began to swell by a large 
number of volunteers who were able to escape the Russian 
orders of mobilization. 

One must have gone through slavery himself in order to 
understand and appreciate the feelings of a nation throwing 
off the shackles of its slavery. 

On August 3, 1914, proclamations of a secret National 
Government were posted in Warsaw which summoned the 
nation to rise against Russia and join hands with the de- 
tachments of the Polish revolutionary army which was com- 
ing up from the Galician frontier. A young Pole, a member 



of the Polish conspiracy, was caught by a Russian poHce 
while posting the aforesaid bills, and on the next day a volley 
shot from the rifles of an executionary squad ended his life 
in the citadel of Warsaw. He was the first victim of the 
war. About two weeks later the proclamation of the Rus- 
sian commander-in-chief was issued; in this proclamation, 
from fear of the awakening revolutionary spirit, a promise 
of autonomy was made to Poland. It was not enough for 
a nation that had older political traditions than Russia but, 
above everything else, the promise came too late. The action 
of the Poles not only came ahead of the armies of both 
sides but also of their promises. In Galicia all the poHtical 
parties succeeded in uniting and in getting into communica- 
tion with the secret National Government in Warsaw. Be- 
cause of the freedom of action in Galicia the center of grav- 
ity of the entire movement was shifted from Warsaw to 
Cracow from where the first signal for the war of inde- 
pendence was issued. On the basis of an agreement between 
the secret and open political parties in Galicia and Russian- 
Poland, which form together two-thirds of the organized 
parties in Poland, the Supreme National Committee was 
organized in Cracow on August 16, 1914; this committee 
until now has the supreme sway over the destinies of the 
nation. It is a political representation of Poland in the 
present war and it is a nucleus of the Polish state, should 
the conscience of the world awake and should Poland gain 
her independence. All the detachments of the Polish revolu- 
tionary forces which were in garrison in Kielce, received the 
name of 'Tolish Legions" from the Supreme National Com- 
mittee. Thus the actual force of the nation, elements 
organized openly or secretly, and based on an entirely demo- 
cratic principle, declared themselves against Russia and 
formed an alliance with Austria-Hungary. The Russian 



promises did not succeed in halting them nor did so the 
memories of the ill-treatment suffered by the Poles to a 
great extent at the hands of Prussia. 

The policy of every nation must be a real one, that means 
it must be based on facts, on real conditions of work and 
not on fantastic dreams. Nobody has any right to condemn 
repubhcan France for allying herself with despotic Russia, 
although French money subsidized the struggle of Russian 
reaction against the progressive movement. Nobody has 
the right to blame England for going hand in hand with 
Russia, although ten years ago England perfectly consciously 
defeated Russia by the Japanese in Eastern Asia. Nobody 
has the right to condemn Servia for allying herself with 
Turkey against Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, although 
grass has not grown as yet on the graves at Kumanowo and 
Lule Burgas. In the same way, nobody can condemn Poland 
for allying herself with Austria-Hungary and throwing her 
forces against Russia. Every nation has a "ratio status" 
of its own, which determines the direction of its policy. 
This ''ratio status" is the result of historical traditions and 
of material conditions for action. Positive results can be 
reached only through positive means. The road to Berlin does 
not lead through the moon but along the strategical line of 
the Rhine or the Vistula. The road from Italy to Trentino 
leads through the Alps but not across the ocean. It is useless 
to vociferate against the Germans when the ammunition 
gives out on the road to BerHn. A certain purpose requires 
positive means and the reality of the means is xietermined 
by the facts and the conditions on the theatre of a war or of 
politics. The alHance of Poland with Austria-Hungary was 
the result of the Polish ''ratio status" and of real conditions 
which already beforehand decided that only by an alliance 
with Austria-Hungary and by a war against Russia, Poland 



can become free and independent. Whoever thinks that the 
decision of Poland was influenced by feeHngs, sympathies, 
promises or fantastic hope, is mistaken. Poland did not stop 
to compare the injuries she suffered from Prussia with 
those she sufifered at Russia's hands. This would have been 
a childish poHcy or a poHcy of nervous artists. Not feelings 
but interest decided the issue. Poland does not fight nowa- 
days because of a desire of revenge against Russia nor be- 
cause of a desire of showing her gratitude to Austria-Hun- 
gary. The anti-Polish policy of Russia was real and sincere, 
but the PoHsh anti-Russian poHcy was in no degree less sin- 
cere and less real. Poland understands and respects the 
"ratio status" of other states and other nations, even that of 
Russia, but Poland puts on the same basis before the world 
her own ''ratio status" and fights for its realization. 

Arms do not terminate war although they decide battles. 
An army with its blood establishes facts but the conclusions 
from these premises are drawn by the diplomats when the 
peace treaties are negotiated. The Polish question is not 
going to be decided on the battlefield, although battles art 
decided on Polish grounds. The PoHsh question shall come 
up together with the whole mass of political questions during 
the coming peace congress regardless of the form which the 
latter shall have. This is the goal for which the Polish 
hopes are aimed, and the work done by the Polish Legions 
paves the way to this goal. 

One hundred years ago the Congress of Vienna was in 
session. The Napoleonic hurricane came to an end and then 
diplomacy started bargaining. The Polish question was one 
of the foremost among the issues confronting the Congress. 
Who did revive the Polish question in Europe? Polish 
troops followed the eagles of Napoleon in his expedition 
against Russia in 1812. The Polish army was headed by 



— 10 — 

Prince Joseph Poniatowski. The PoHsh army commanded 
by him was the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw es- 
tablished by Napoleon in 1807 at the peace treaty of Tilsit. 
Poland has established right at the very beginning of the 
Napoleonic era a military representation on the side of 
France. Then appeared for the first time the idea of Polish 
Legions. By way of Italy, Egypt and even Santo Domingo 
in America the Polish legions began their march to Warsaw. 
The road was a long one and cost a heavy toll of blood, but 
finally it led the legions to their intended goal. The PoHsh 
legions were not animated only by hatred when combating 
Russia nor did they help France only because of any feeling 
of sympathy. There were feelings even very keen, strong 
and sacred feelings, but they were far from deciding the 
Polish policy. The decisive factor was the desire of creating 
a Polish military representation on the background of Na- 
poleonic wars in order thus to create a representation for 
the Pohsh aspirations for freedom and in order to confront 
Europe with the Polish question. Liberty can be gained only 
by blood and iron and therefore the flag carried by the Polish 
legions of a hundred years ago was such a flag of blood and 
iron. The glory which fell upon this flag of the legions 
became the glory of the Polish nation, and it was because of 
the merit of these legions that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
was established at the peace treaty of Tilsit. 

Napoleon was defeated, and his defeat meant at the same 
time the military defeat of the Polish cause. The com- 
mander of the Polish army. Prince Joseph Poniatowski, a 
hero known very well to-day all over Europe and a field- 
marshal of Napoleon's army, was drowned in the River 
Elster while covering the retreat of Napoleon from Leipzig. 
The Polish cause, however, did not perish. In spite of the 
military defeat the Polish legions of the Napoleonic army 



— 11 — 

caused the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland with a 
separate parliament and a Polish army in Warsaw. The fact 
that the Polish army helped Napoleon against Russia and 
thus against England did not obscure the view of the Cabinet 
of London. England did not hesitate to support the Polish 
cause against Russia although Russia was an ally of England 
in the latter 's life and death struggle against Napoleon. The 
attack which in the battle of Leipzig Prince Joseph Ponia- 
towski led against the village of Probstheida occupied by 
Russian troops commanded by Emperor Alexander I him- 
self, was therefore something more than a mere incident of 
this ^'battle of nations.'' By conquering Probstheida, Prince 
Joseph Poniatowski ''was conquering the capital of the 
future Kingdom of Poland under the eyes of this Kingdom's 
future monarch.'"'' Prince Joseph Poniatowski perished 
and only remnants of the Polish regiments were left when 
the Napoleonic epopee came to an end. The blood and iron, 
however, have done their work : Polish regiments have com- 
pelled Europe to look at them as the representatives of the 
Polish state. Czar Alexander I had to yield to the opinion 
of Europe ; and the Poles, although they lost militarily, they 
won, however, a political victory. They won the Kingdom 
of Poland which was supposed to be the nucleus for the 
future full reconstruction of Poland. Unfortunately, several 
years later Russia has broken the treaty of Vienna and 
abolished the constitution of the young state. 

The example set by the Polish legions of a hundred years 
ago serves to-day as a guide for the Polish legions in the 
present war. The example of Prince Joseph Poniatowski 
is nowadays the guide of Pilsudzki in the present war. 
Regardless of the military result the fact will remain on 
the records of history that in the great European war 

* S. Askenazy : "Ksi^ze Jozef Poniatowski," 1913, page 292. 



— 12 — 

Poland created her own military representation to remind 
the world of the fact of her bloody and heroic existence 
to force the world to face the question of Polish inde- 
pendence. The future Congress will decide the issue, but 
the blood of the PoHsh legions will be the seed of liberty 
when finally the conscience of the world will awake and "one 
of the biggest crimes in history will have an end/'* This is 
the basis of the PoHsh "ratio status" in the period of 
Poland's subjugation. Nobody had the right to demand that 
Poland should act against this "ratio status" of hers nor that 
it should follow the inspiration of the moment or believe in 
and wait for the fulfilment of somebody's promises. Poland 
exists between the hammer and the anvil, and every other na- 
tion would take the same course that Poland did, and the same 
course that the Polish legions took in the present war. This 
road agrees with the Polish traditions against Russia and 
with the Polish alliance with Austria-Hungary. The rea- 
son for this is a very simple and a very real one : the creat- 
ing of a military representation was impossible in any other 
way. The first year of the European war has proved this 
contention by the force of facts. The attempt of Russia 
to organize a Polish legion in Warsaw against Austria- 
Hungary and Germany failed sadly and there is no Polish 
legion siding with Russia. On the other hand, the Polish 
legions against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary 
are developing fast and have reached already the figure of 
many thousands of men. The evacuation of Warsaw in- 
creased the numerical strength of the Polish legions con- 
siderably. So the actual facts proved which side showed 
more possibility and actual opportunity : the decision proved 
to be a practical one against Russia and for an alliance with 
Austria-Hungary. 

* Clemenceau, 1. c. 



— 13 — 

Poland is not a free country. Every male citizen in 
Poland is compelled to serve in either the Russian or the 
German or the Austro-Hungarian army. The outbreak of 
the war came as suddenly as a thunder-bolt from a clear 
sky. The mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria- 
Hungary took about a million men away from Poland within 
twenty-four hours. The rest of able-bodied Polish men 
were confronted by the possibility of being called to the 
colors as the war continued. To-day we can safely say 
that after the first year of the war is over there remained 
in Poland only women, children and old people. How could 
an army be formed under such conditions? The best judg- 
ment and the greatest sympathies cannot possibly raise an 
army when men are lacking. Recruiting cannot be done on 
the moon nor can officers be made over night and the 
question of an army is not a question of improvising one. 
The mobilization of the Polish Legions therefore on the 
background of the mobilization in Russia, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary could only be conducted on the basis of 
the logic of actual conditions and not on the basis of 
feelings, of sympathies or dispositions. The territory in 
which the recruiting for Polish Legions was possible was 
the left bank of the Vistula in the Kingdom of Poland. 
Galicia and Posen could not furnish an adequate supply of 
recruits because they form together only 20 per cent, of 
the historical territory of Poland, and besides the mobih- 
zation of Austria-Hungary and of Germany goes quicker 
than the mobilization of Russia. This is the first fact of 
great importance, because owing to this fact the Russian 
mobilization was compelled to leave against its very inten- 
tions a large material of men for purpose of Polish policy. 
It was of no less importance that the Russian mobilization 
is less exact, that it proceeds more slowly, and that 



— 14 — 

Russia possesses 80 per cent, of the Polish historical terri- 
tory and the old Polish capital of Warsaw. Those were the 
real conditions which regardless of the sympathies or the 
antipathies decided beforehand that by waging war against 
Russia only on the territory of Russian-Poland could the 
recruiting for the Polish Legions have any chance of suc- 
cess. 

The map will show that the frontiers of Russian-Poland 
are flanked on the north by the Prussian frontier and on 
the south by the frontier of Galicia. In case of war there 
was a danger for the Russian armies in Russian-Poland that 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, which have a speedier 
mobilization, would by a flank attack from the north and 
from the south, cut them off on the Vistula and destroy 
them before the reserves from the interior of Russia would 
be able to reach the theatre of war. Russia was made 
aware of this danger long ago by ^^ome of her best generals 
such as Dragomirow, Hurko and even Kuropatkin. Accord- 
ing to their judgment Russia had to evacuate in the first 
few weeks of the war the left bank of the Vistula for 
strategical reasons so that the reserves coming up from the 
interior of Russia would have a shorter road for getting 
to the battle line and thus be able to reach the seat of war 
before the armies of the enemy would be able to move for- 
ward from the north and from the south. This was known 
both in Poland and in Western Europe. France was afraid 
of this possibility as France was compelled to depend on 
a speedy offensive movement of Russia in the direction of 
Berlin and on this plan were based the hopes of France 
to protect Paris from a violent onrush of the German armies. 
This was a decisive fact for Poland. The evacuation of the 
western provinces of Russian-Poland by the Russians meant 
in case of the outbreak of the war the stopping of the 



— 15 — 

Russian mobilization in these districts. The western dis- 
tricts of Russian-Poland are chiefly industrial. Here are 
to be found large coal mines in the valley of D^browa and 
of Sosnowiec, and besides there is a number of industrial 
centres such as Czf stochowa or Nowo-Radomsk. The out- 
break of the war closed the factories and the mines : the 
masses of laboring men were thrown out of employment, 
and as Russia had to retreat there was left for the Polish 
legions ready and very useful material of men. Thus the 
Polish legions recruited the majority of their soldiers from 
these sections of the country. Eighty per cent, of the 
soldiers in the Polish Legions were recruited in Russian- 
Poland and the majority among them came from the indus- 
trial districts which Russia had to evacuate in the begin- 
ning of the war temporarily for strategical reasons. This 
was an anticipated fact but still it played a decisive part 
in the Polish policy. The mobilization of Poland had to be 
necessarily directed against Russia if it was to be of any 
use and if it was to give results. 

The rest of the task of organization rested with Galicia 
which for over half a century enjoyed the benefits of 
autonomy within the general constitution of Austria-Hun- 
gary. "Galicia has not been unhappy.*'* In Posen there 
are no Polish schools nor Polish university : in Russian- 
Poland there was a university, but a Russian one, and all 
schools were Russian too while private schools suffered from 
exceedingly heavy restrictions on the part of the Russian 
Government. In Posen, the Commission of Colonization 
originated by Bismarck bought up Polish land and settled 
it with Germans. In Russian-Poland the "Bank wloscianski" 
has done the same for over fifty years and colonizes Polish 



' "The Germans," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 



— 16 — 

land with Orthodox Russian peasants. In Lithuania and 
Little Russia the Poles are absolutely forbidden to buy land 
nor to sell to anyone except a Russian. Thus a Pole can- 
not acquire land which actually belongs to the Poles, neither 
in Lithuania or in Little Russia. Czar Nicholas I invented 
the system of destroying the Polish nation and Bismarck 
became his apt pupil. This was done very much to the 
disadvantage of Russia and of Germany and brought great 
harm to Poland. The development of the Polish nation thus 
remained under the most trying conditions, whereby great 
mistakes were committed in Petrograd with regard to 
the Polish question and still greater ones were committed 
by Berlin. The friendship between Germany and Russia 
was the basis for oppressing Poland. The celebration of 
the 500th anniversary of the victory of Grunwald, where 
the combined forces of Poland and Lithuania annihilated 
the power of the Teutonic Knights, could not be celebrated 
in Warsaw but ^ only in Cracow in spite of the fact that 
not Russia but Austria-Hungary was in alliance with Ger- 
many. The monument of the victory over the Germans 
could be erected, and in fact still stands in Cracow but 
could not possibly stand in Warsaw. This is enough said 
to the initiated. It is a basis for understanding the policy 
of Poland in the present war. Owing to her autonomical 
freedom Galicia was able to become the territory on which 
the preparations for the future war of independence could 
be carried on. The best material of men from Russian- 
Poland took refuge in GaHcia where these elements could 
be instructed militarily in special Polish military organiza- 
tions. Thus GaHcia educated the officers for the present 
Polish legions and only- Galicia was able to do it. The 
first detachments of the Polish Legions which crossed the 
Russian frontier north of Cracow were skeleton detach- 



— 17 — 

ments composed only of officers and under-officers. On the 
left bank of the Vistula there were waiting for them the 
Polish recruits who were spared by the Russian mobihza- 
tion and only too anxious to fight for their own sacred 
cause of independence. 

This, however, was an old program and not a new one 
by any means. 

In the years 1876-1878 when there was a danger of a 
war between Austria-Hungary and Russia on account of 
the Balkan situation all the political parties of Poland united 
in order to prepare a new revolution against Russia in alli- 
ance with Austria-PIungary. For this purpose a "Con- 
federation of the Polish Nation" was formed which played 
the part of a political representation of the nation. The 
movement was headed by Prince Sapieha who was assisted 
by Rev. Albin Dunajewski who subsequently was Bishop 
of Cracow and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. 
In those times England was on terms of friendship with 
Germany and protected Constantinople from the appetite 
of Russia. Thus England worked behind the stage in organ- 
izing a Polish revolution against Russia. The plan of the 
revolution consisted of marching armed and well organ- 
ized detachments of revolutionary armies into Russian- 
Poland from Galicia : these detachments were intended to 
be the nucleus of the future Polish army. Russian-Poland 
was expected to furnish the men and Galicia the officers. 
The English Government was well informed of the entire 
plan and even promised to help quietly by furnishing arms 
and money. Cardinal Manning, who was famous all over 
England took part in a secret meeting of Polish politicians 
in Vienna: at this meeting important decisions were taken 
in case the war should really break out. There was no war, 
however, but the Congress of Berlin completed the diplo- 



— 18 — 

matic defeat of Russia. A tradition was left behind in 
Poland, however, to that effect that England has under- 
stood the Polish "ratio status" which prompted the Poles 
to avail themselves of their liberties in Galicia in order 
to prepare a revolution in Russian-Poland. For forty years 
ever since the Congress of Berlin, Poland did not discon- 
tinue her policy and constantly instructed young men in 
secret and in open organizations of military nature. Poland's 
policy was not altered by the fact that Austria-Hungary 
entered into an alliance with Germany which has lasted 
for over thirty years and furnished ample time to recon- 
sider the matter: Poland's policy was not altered even 
when Prussia began a systematic oppression in Posen and 
England failed to protest against such treatment of the 
Poles. Just at this particular time England ceded Heligo- 
land which became the basis for Germany's naval power. 
Several years later England preferred to threaten France 
with war on account of the Fashoda incident than to inter- 
vene at Berlin for the protection of the Poles although 
the oppression of the Poles in Posen by Prussia violated the 
treaty of Vienna of 1815. Bismarck was not fond of the 
sea and Poland is not Belgium and Warsaw does not face 
London. Poland felt bitterly over being abandoned to her 
fate by Western Europe, but she did not deter her from fol- 
lowing her anti-Russian policy. 

When after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1908 by Austria-Hungary, the danger of war became 
imminent to Poland, new organizations were added to those 
which existed since the time of the Congress of Berlin and 
preparations were going on feverishly. The Polish ''ratio 
status" did not change at all since the time when Cardinal 
Manning conferred in Vienna with representatives of Poland 
on the details of a revolution against Russia. To-day Eng- 



— 19 — 

land is militarily allied with Russia: the English tactics 
changed, but the conditions in Poland did not. Cardinal 
Dunajewski is also dead, but another dignitary of the Roman 
Catholic Church, Bishop Bandurski, is a member of the 
Supreme National Committee. The only change that has 
occurred is that Poland's sufferings became greater and 
deeper. Should this be the reason why England no longer 
understands the Polish ''ratio status,'' although England has 
understood it and recognized it forty years ago under 
analogous conditions for Poland? 

Poland has been and is still in a most precarious position. 
She could not do anything else but fight against Russia, 
and in order to do this she had to draw her recruits from 
Russian-Poland and her supply of officers from Galicia. 
This was not prompted by feelings but by actual conditions 
of things. Not because of blind hatred but because of absolute 
necessity was Poland compelled to direct her main attacks 
against Russia. Warsaw the Capital of Poland and besides 
eighty per cent, of Poland's territory was in Russia's hands 
or in other words, Russia held the trunk of Poland's body. 
It is therefore quite natural that the Polish attack had to 
be directed against Russia. 

On October 2, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Government 
drafted a diplomatic note addressed to all neutral coun- 
tries in which the said government officially recognized the 
Polish Legions as combatants. This important document 
ended as follows : 

''Any action on the part of Russia which would imply a 
refusal to recognize the Polish Legions as a combatant 
party would constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions 
of the Convention of The Hague and against which the Gov- 
ernment of Austria-Hungary already now files a most cate- 
gorical protest." 



— 20 — 

This note was published by the 'Tremdenblatt" of Vienna, 
which is the official organ of the Ministry of Foreign Afifairs. 
Thus the Polish military representation obtained an official 
sanction. The Polish soldier became a poHtical factor in 
Europe because the note of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment secured for him the protection of international law. 
The future peace congress has therefore a perfect freedom 
of action with regard to the PoHsh question. When some 
time in the future the hostihties will be suspended this 
moment will find the Polish Legions in the field. Regard- 
less of the military result of the war this is going to be a 
fact which from the former point of view will greatly facili- 
tate the reviving of the Polish question at the time of the 
coming peace congress. According to international law 
Poland is only a combatant party but is not a belligerent 
one because there is only a Polish nation and no PoHsh 
state. Hitherto only a Polish military representation is rec- 
ognized in the world-war; nevertheless, the Polish Legions 
can constitute a material as well as a formal point of 
departure for the initiative in the Polish question when the 
future peace congress will meet. Poland hopes that the 
conscience of the world will awake and that historical jus- 
tice is going to be done. Poland did everything on her 
part to organize a military representation of her own, and 
it is now Europe's turn to bring about the happiness of 
humanity and the freedom of nations when this awful war 
will come to an end. 

The note of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Polish 
Legions has greatly alarmed Russia. Petrograd decided 
therefore at once upon an attempt of organizing in Warsaw 
of Polish Legions for the purpose of combating against the 
Germans. It was an intrigue intended for provoking a vol- 
untary fight between the Poles themselves and thus kiUing 



— 21 — 

the Polish question from the international point of view. 
Organizing two military representations is absurd. The 
danger for Poland was great and because of unemployment, 
famine and particularly because of the mistakes made by 
the policy of Prussia with regard to Poland in the times 
preceding the war it was comparatively easy for Russia to 
mislead individuals. Poland is an oppressed country, with- 
out a government after all, and therefore every individual 
has a free hand to act as he pleases. Oppression has accus- 
tomed the nation to the principle of ''liberum censeo/' which 
principle permits every individual to consider himself as his 
own governor. The level of political enlightenment of the 
masses is not equal in all parts of Poland, where, by the way, 
the schools are in other hands than those of the Poles 
and where a general oppression prevails. Russia therefore 
determined to destroy what the legions of Cracow have 
accompHshed politically. In November, 1914, that means 
about four months after the Polish Legions have crossed 
the Russian frontier. Czar Nicholas II has commissioned 
his Chamberlain, Count Wielopolski, to organize in Warsaw 
a Polish" National Committee as a competition to the Supreme 
National Committee of Cracow. The right hand and in 
fact the brain of Count Wielopolski's action was a confi- 
dential man of the Russian Government, a former member 
of the Duma, Roman Dmowski. A portion of the Polish 
nobility and of the moneyed bourgeoisie supported this 
movement. 

During all revolutions there were loyal parties, which dis- 
trusted the sword and were apt to believe in deceitful prom- 
ises. The French Revolution had its loyalists and so had it 
American revolution in times of Washington. 

The first utterance of the Committee of Warsaw was the 
proclamation of November 25, 1914, in which a protest was 



— 22 — 

made against the Supreme National Committee : the authors 
of this proclamation, however, did not have the courage of 
denying the fact that Austria-Hungary was "the only state 
in which our national rights had met with a measure of 
recognition."* The autonomy of Galicia has been in force 
for over half a century, while the autonomy under Russian 
sovereignty was hitherto only a promise of the commander- 
in-chief. Under such conditions and because of a number 
of other practical considerations which were explained above, 
the Committee of Warsaw was necessarily without real 
backing among the Poles. All democratic parties refused 
to support the Committee in question: the latter tried to 
gain in importance by co-operating with the Committee of 
the Polish members of the Russian Duma in Petrograd. 
Russian-Poland used to elect to the Russian Duma 
only fourteen deputies out of a population of 12,000,000. 
Besides, the election law was of the most reactionary nature 
and deprived the masses of the people of any influence what- 
soever. For these reasons the Poles boycotted the Russian 
Duma since the reactionary times of Stolypin and only the 
nobility and certain elements of the moneyed bourgeoisie 
took part in the election. This condition of things was cor- 
rectly estimated by the London "Times," which, after the 
outbreak of the war and after the declaration of loyalty 
on the part of the Polish members of the Duma, has ques- 
tioned the poHtical value of their move because "chosen on 
the franchise and in the conditions which exist," they cannot 
"speak for the whole people."t The London ''Times" is a 
newspaper of high standing and therefore had its doubts, 
which by the way were quite justified, whether the Polish 

* "Poland, Russia and the War," by Alma Tadema, London, 191^, 
page 21. 

t The '"Times," London, August 17, 1914. 



— 23 — 

nation will be able ''to forget 1830 and 1863?" Reality has 
soon manifested itself in spite of the artificial propaganda 
made by the press. The Committee of Warsaw supported 
the Russian plan of organizing a Polish Legion on Russia's 
side. A most spirited propaganda was carried on for three 
months and failed completely. The nation did not back up 
the action, and no army can be raised on paper nor by spilling 
streams of ink and making a propaganda. Several hundred 
of misled volunteers were quietly incorporated into the 
Russian army : thus the entire undertaking failed politically. 
The Russian intrigue came to a naught and the moral stand- 
ing as well as the numerical strength of the Polish Legions 
organized in Cracow was increased considerably. 

The reasons for Russia's failure in Warsaw were very 
grave ones. Russia promised autonomy to Poland but she 
did not promise independence. While the war that is waged 
at the present time is conducted for the sake of the liberty 
of nations Russia only offered autonomy which by the way 
was only administrative and not legislative. To the Poles 
it meant only uniting under one yoke instead of under three 
which was far from being a program of independence. All 
illusions were swept away by the Corriere della Sera of 
Milano which stated that the Czar has purposely failed to 
sign the proclamation with regard to the Polish cause.* The 
''Gotos Moskwy" confirmed this by betraying the fact that 
the manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas was not backed up 
at all by the Russian Government and that this was merely 
a tactical move which was required from Russia by Gen- 
eral Joffre. The attitude of the Russian Government dur- 
ing the war gave conclusively justified the suspicions of 
Poland since Russia did not cease for one moment to ex- 
terminate all aspirations for Polish independence. The 

* "For a Lasting Peace/* Paris, 1915, page 23. 



— U — 

Russian Government has forbidden to put the White Eagle, 
which is the national emblem of Poland, on the flags of the 
Legion that Russia attempted to organize in Warsaw, and 
even Polish national anthems were sternly prohibited by 
the police."^ While this was going on the Russian Govern- 
ment abolished autonomy in Eastern Galicia which was 
then occupied by the Russian armies and began to proceed 
with the russification of this province. 

Eastern Galicia never formed a part of Russia and 
belonged to Poland ever since 1340. From the ethnograph- 
ical point of view it has a mixed population the majority 
of which is Ruthenian in the eastern district of the said 
province. This, however, does not justify at all Russian 
imperialism. The Ruthenians and the Russians have just 
as much in common as the Belgian Walons have with France 
or the Belgian Flamands with Holland. Does this entitle 
France or Holland to annex Belgium? The imperiaHsm 
of Russia, however, did not possess any nationaHstic scru- 
ples in spite of the fact that international law does not 
permit a legal annexation of an occupied territory. Count 
Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of Eastern Galicia, de- 
clared right upon his arrival in Lemberg that he "shall 
introduce here the Russian language, Russian law, the Rus- 
sian state administration," and that ''the Polish Diet shall 
not be convoked.^t In consequence thereof the Polish 
university as well as all educational institutions, both Polish 
and Ruthenian, were closed at once. Every possible auton- 
omy has been abolished at once and instead the Russian 
despotic and anti-democratic system of government was 
introduced. Tshichatshef, who advocated the separation of 
the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, in the Russian 

* "Nowa Gazeta," Warsaw, November ii, 1914. 
t "For a Lasting Peace," page 2^. 



— 25 — 

Duma has with a knowledge of the Russian Government 
outlined a plan for colonizing Galicia with Russian Orth- 
odox peasants.* Only the defeat of the Russian armies 
and the liberation of Lemberg has saved Galicia from the 
activity of the Russian "Bank wtoscianski" which distin- 
guishes itself from the Prussian Commission of Coloniza- 
tion only by the fact of being older. Besides religious tol- 
erance was abolished and the Greek Orthodox religion was 
introduced forcibly. The Greek Catholic Church which for 
centuries was united with the Roman Church was slated as 
a victim. And Russia attempted to introduce religious per- 
secution into Eastern Galicia after having already made a 
bloody debut of a similar action in the province of Kholm, 
in Lithuania and in the Ukraina. History, however, has 
already passed a sentence on this action of Russia by say- 
ing as follows : 'In Poland's ancient provinces, inhabited 
by the united Greeks, the government obliged the people to 
sign addresses to the Czar, asking him for the restoration 
of the Orthodox rehgion. Those who refused to sign were 
put into prison or deported. f The culminating point of the 
Russian method of converting to the Orthodox religion, 
was the year 1875. In Kroze few volleys had been fired 
into praying crowds of Greek Catholic worshipers, and in 
other parts of Russian-Poland thousands of people were 
deported to Siberia, and thus the Greek Catholic Church 
has been destroyed in Eastern Poland. At once after the 
temporary occupation of Lemberg by the Russian armies the 
Russian Bishop Eulogius came on a similar mission to East- 
ern Galicia. His action has soon manifested itself. The 
"Russkij InwaHd'' pubhshed in January, 1915, the news that 
Bishop Eulogius had submitted to the Holy Synod in Petro- 

* "Nowoje Wremia," Petrograd, April 15, 1915. 

t M. Seignobos : "Contemporary History," 1910, page 422. 



— 26 — 

grad a report in which he insisted upon "abolishing in 
GaHcia of the spiritual Greek Catholic hierarchy because 
the Russian law does not recognize the Greek Catholic 
Church."* 

Sapienti sat, 

''Slavic brotherhood and liberating the Poles from Prus- 
sian oppression" proved in practice to be nothing else but 
introducing of Russian oppression into autonomous Galicia 
which was the last refuge of free Polish thought. The zeal 
of Russia in this direction unfortunately proved to be a 
universal one. No voice of protest was raised by anybody 
in Russia and once more voices became loud suggesting the 
exclusion of the Polish question from the questions to be 
decided by the future peace congress. The Russian reac- 
tionary party as well as the progressive party joined 
hands in order to prevent the Polish question to become 
something else than ''an internal problem of Slavdom," 
which in practice meant nothing else but an internal problem 
of the Russian Government. It is useless to speak about the 
reactionary party because its feelings toward Poland were 
only too well known. It was more painful that even Briant- 
shaninov, a truly liberal Russian politician agreed with the 
reactionary party that "Europe should under no circum- 
stances take any part in the settlement of the mutual 
relations between Russia and Poland. "f The progressive 
"Utro Rossi ji" went still further, and considered the sug- 
gestions of turning over the Polish question for settlement 
to England, France and Russia, even with exclusion of Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Germany, as "illegal and criminal," be- 
cause the organization of future Poland "does not of right 



* "Goniec," Warsaw, January 17, 1915. 

t "Kurjer poranny/' Warsaw, March 11, 1915. 



— 37 — 

rest with any congresses at all."* Anybody, however, who 
would suggest that the fate of Poland should not depend 
upon the mercy of the victor was threatened with deporta- 
tion to Siberia. 

Independence can either be an absolute one or can ac- 
quire the form of a state within a state, as such is the case 
with Hungary or with Bavaria. Russia is opposed to such 
either form of independence as far as Poland is concerned. 
Russia is afraid of an absolute independence of Poland be- 
cause such an independence of Poland would keep Russia 
away from Central Europe and would stop Russia's pressure 
on the road leading through Vienna to Constantinople. 
Russia is furthermore afraid of Poland as a state within the 
state under the domination of Russia because the freedom 
of Poland could turn out to be contagious for Russia herself 
and particularly for Finland and the Caucasus. The free- 
dom of Poland is a danger to reactionary government and to 
despotism. The fear of progress prompted Russia to prom- 
ise Poland in the present war nothing else but autonomy, 
administrative and not legislative at that. 

The Russian plan with regard to Poland created an 
impression in Western Europe and particularly in America, 
because it has promised the uniting of the entire Poland 
under the sceptre of the Czar. The Russian plan has thus 
promised one yoke instead of three and has thus apparently 
simpHfied matters. All these beautiful phrases, however, 
concealed a truly Byzantinic perfidy. Poland has ethno- 
graphical as well as poHtical boundaries : the first ones are 
boundaries of actual settlement while the other ones are 
boundaries of the Polish State which has ceased to exist. 
Russia decided to apply to the eastern portion of Poland 
the ethnographical principle and to the western portion of 

* "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 7, 191 5. 



— 28 — 

Poland the historical principle. Acting on this basis Russia 
has separated before the war the province of Kholm from 
Russian-Poland, and during the war, Eastern Galicia from 
Austrian-Poland, whereby she assumed the point of view 
that the territory settled by the Ruthenians in Galicia 
reaches as far as the upper course of the Dunajec. In con- 
tradiction with the historical fact that neither the province 
of Kholm nor Eastern Galicia have ever formed a part of 
the Russian State, and in contradiction with the ethno- 
graphical fact that the Ruthenians are not Russians, Russia 
considered the province of Kholm and Galicia as far as the 
course of the upper Dunajec as Russian territory and en- 
deavored to eliminate them from Polish influence. This 
meant nothing else but cutting slices away from Poland 
in the east promising at the same time to extend the boun- 
daries in the west. For Kholm, Lemberg, Przemysl, and 
Nowy S^cz Russia promised to Poland, Cracow, Silesia, 
Posen, Danzig, and Koenigsburg. Cracow used to be the 
crowning place of the Polish Kings, Posen was the cradle of 
Poland, Danzig was Poland's harbor on the Baltic Sea, 
Silesia fell apart from Poland even before the end of the 
Middle Ages and was not a part of Poland at the time of 
Poland's partitions, while Koenigsburg was the capital of a 
feudal principality of Poland and not the capital of a Polish 
province. Koenigsburg was the capital of East Prussia 
which was built up in the Middle Ages by the Teutonic 
Knights during their wars against Slav tribes. The program 
of Russia in the west agreed, therefore, with the historical 
traditions of Poland and not with the ethnographical con- 
siderations. This program apparently flattered the Polish 
national pride but in outlining this program Russia was 
prompted by different and very selfish reasons. The boun- 
daries of historical Poland agree with the boundaries needed 



— 29 — 

by Russian strategical considerations on Russia's western 
frontier. These considerations form the question of the 
Vistula line of defence. The uniting of Polish territories 
under the sceptre of the Czar would solve very advantage- 
ously for Russia the paradox of the Vistula, which before 
the war passed through three different states. By uniting 
Poland the Vistula would become an internal river of the 
Russian Empire and the frontier would move west as far 
as the upper Oder. In the first year of this war the Russian 
press has on different occasions stated quite plainly that 
strategical considerations are pushing Russia as far west as 
Frankfort on the Oder. 

The forcible pushing of the frontier of future Poland 
in the westerly direction, and at the same time cutting off the 
genuine Polish soil in its eastern part, raises the relative per 
cent, of the German element in Poland to the disadvantage 
of the native element. Eastern Prussia is inhabited by 
2,064,175 people, but there are only 16 per cent, of Poles. 
Eastern Prussia never was a Polish province, but only a 
principality held in feudal tenure. In Western Prussia the 
population numbers 1,703,477, but the per cent, of Poles is 
35, especially so on bojh banks of the Vistula River which 
used to be a road to the sea at the time of the Polish kingdom. 
The Province of Posen, the cradle of the Polish state, has 
2,099,831 people, and in this number there are only 765,000 
Germans. The lower, middle and upper Silesias are in- 
habited by 5,225,962 people. Poles inhabit mostly upper 
Silesia, their number being 1,158,789. All of these provinces 
constitute the so-called Prussian part of former Poland, 
lost by Poland at the time of her partition, or before it, as 
it was the case with Silesia and Eastern Prussia. The Polish 
population on this entire area numbers 3,646,446. The 
German population in both Eastern and Western Prussia »s 



— 30 — 

2,922,699; in the Province of Posen, 765,000; in Silesia 
4,067,173, totaling 7,754,822. Consequently there are here 
twice as many Germans as Poles."*" The cause of this pre- 
ponderance of German element is the fact that Silesia and 
Eastern Prussia were undergoing a process of Germaniza- 
tion still in the Middle Ages, and they did not belong to 
Poland at the time of her partition. The Russian plans to 
make the Vistula an internal river of the Russian empire en- 
dangers the Polish ethnographical interests, since they in- 
troduce too large a percentage of Germans into the Polish 
organism. 

When the ethnographical data of Russian-Poland, West- 
ern Galicia and of Prussian-Poland, which provinces Russia 
promised to reunite, are compared, the danger becomes very 
evident. The population of Russian-Poland is 12,467,300, 
of which Poles number 9,115,220; Germans, 618,590; Jews, 
1,660,490. The population of Galicia is 8,025,675, Poles 
claim 4,000,000, Ruthenians 3,674,000 and Germans 212,000. 
Russia intends to annex Eastern Galicia up to the line of 
the lower San, lower Wislock, and upper Dunajec. In other 
words, for the '^United Poland" there would be left only two 
'^governments,'' that of Cracow and that of Tarnow. In 
doing this Russia separates ethnographically about 2,500,000 
Poles in the middle, and Eastern Galicia and leaves them a 
prey to russification. This plan allows ''United Poland" 
only 1,500,000 Poles out of Galicia. The ethnographical 
aspect of Poland thus ^'United" would be as follows : 

Russian-Poland 9,115,220 Poles 

Western Galicia 1,500,000 " 

Polish provinces retaken from 

Prussia 3,646,446 " 

Total 14,261,666 Poles 

* According to "The New International Yearbook," New York, 
1914, and according to Polish statistics. 



— 31 — 

The number of Germans on the same area would be : 

(1) In the parts retaken from Prussia, 7,754,822 people — 
if Silesia and Eastern Prussia would also be united with 
Poland. 

(2) In Russian-Poland, together with the Jews, 2,279,080. 

(3) In Western Galicia 212,000, and together with those 
Jews who do not claim to be Poles, about 500,000. 

The total number of Germans and Jews in Poland "Re- 
united,'' according to thie Russian prescription, would be 
10,533,902. 

It is plain now that such a plan only furthers German 
interests if the historical frontiers of Poland are extended 
in the westerly direction, while at the same time its eastern 
possessions are separated from it. The Jewish jargon is 
only a corrupted German, and the Jews were always in 
middle Europe, and especially in Poland, the vanguard of 
Teutonism. In defining the boundaries of Poland, and using 
the ethnographical key in the east, and the historical key in 
the west, Russia would create an ethnographical paradox, a 
state with a mixed population, where sooner or later a serious 
internal strife would be bound to arise. That is what Russia 
is aiming at, since then the Russian government would play 
the part of a peacemaker. The national strifes would render 
the normal development of the autonomy impossible, and 
would soon enable Russia to retake the power to Petrograd. 
The life of the promised autonomy would be a short one and 
the triumph of despotism early. 

It is hard to assume that Europe would permit of the 
strategical occupation by Russia of the upper Oder River. 
Practically this is the only plan of occupation of the upper 
Silesia and perhaps of small parts of the middle and lower 
Silesia. Under these circumstances t'he number of Germans 
within the boundaries of Poland ''United'' by Russians 



— 32 — 

would be lower, but the ratio would be at any rate that 
of eight Germans and Jews, to fourteen Poles. This 
is entirely too large a ratio to reflect favorably on the in- 
ternal conditions of the future state. The Germans consti- 
tute a rich, capable and aggressive element. The Jews are 
by no means inferior to them as far as aggressiveness is 
concerned, and they represented always, with their culture 
and language, the vanguard of Germanism in middle Europe. 
Both of them possess enormous financial resources, whicha 
they would throw upon Poland, devastated by war, in orderf 
to buy out the land and seize the industry with the help of 
foreign money. Russia never hesitated in her internal af- 
fairs to employ the Germans against the Poles, and still less 
would she hesitate to use them for the annihilation of auton- 
omy of Poland "United," under the Czar's sceptre. A terri- 
fying picture for Poland! It is by no means an empty 
phrase that the Jewish jargon is only corrupted German, 
and that the Jews were and still are, in middle Europe, the 
vanguard of Germanism. Jewish journalists frequently 
stated that the Jewish jargon ''belongs to the great family 
of German languages, and that the Jews, despite the 500 
years spent in the Slavic environment, preserved the German 
language, and even to-day belong to the German cultural 
stock.''* As a consequence many of the Jewish leaders, who, 
up to the time of expulsion of Russians from Galicia, wooed 
Russia, now look up to the favors of victorious Berlin that 
it may support Jews against Poles, since the Jews form in 
Poland a ''German cultural island." 

There was a sly reservation in the manifesto in which 
Nicolai Nikolayevitsh promised Poland reunion and auton- 
omy under the sceptre of the Czar — "There is but one thing 

* Sonntagsblatt der "New Yorker Staatszeitung," i8, 7, 191 5. "Die 
osteuropaeische Judenfrage und der Krieg," by Dr. Malamed. 



— 33 — 

that Russia expects from you, that you respect the rights 
of those nationalities with which history has bound you/' 
This was an attempt to check-mate the future of Poland 
with the Jewish question. The Jewish press of the whole 
world, basing itself on the above manifesto, started to de- 
mand equal national rights for Jews in Poland. Russia is 
I<iiown all over for her antisemitic feelings. Up to the latter 
days of this war, the Jews were not permitted to settle in 
Russia proper. The area permitted for Jewish settlement is 
more or less coincident with the area of the former Kingdom 
of Poland. The center of gravity of the Jewish question was 
by means of terrorism and pogroms transferred toward the 
Vistula. As the result of this partial policy of Petrograd, 
the percentage of Jews on. Polish soil rose to a higher degree 
than anywhere else. In Russian-Poland the Jews constitute 
13.71 per cent, of the 12,464,300 total population. In 
Lithuania and Polish-Ruthenia the percentage is somewhat 
higher. It is an artificial result of the antisemitic policy of 
the Russian government which routs the Jews from Russia 
proper and takes ''fatherly" care of them in Poland. The 
manifesto of Prince Nikolai struck the same note, although 
it enveloped it discreetly with an appeal to justice. 

The public opinion in Russia saw through it at once. 
Prince E. Trubeckoi, a recognized authority in Russian 
political life, published an address in which he expressed his 
satisfaction and hope that Russia, after the victory, will be 
able to solve two of her most vexing problems, namely, the 
Polish and Jewish question.''' And Milukoff. the leader of 
the Liberals in Russia, pointed out very clearly the parallel- 
ism of both questions in his daring statement that ''the coun- 
try across the Vistula is not exclusively inhabited by Poles, 
but that there exists another nationality, the Jews, who have 

* "Russkoje Wiedomosti/* lo, 31, 1914. 



— 34 — 

a right to be considered as a separate people, though being 
in the minority/'* The same Russia which could not afford 
to grant equal civic rights to the Jews wants future Poland 
to grant them more, namely, the recognition of separate na- 
tional rights, which Jews do not possess anywhere else in 
Western Europe, and in America. Both the philosemitic 
progressive party and the antisemitic reactionary party joined 
hands in order to sustain the former Russian policy toward 
the Jews, the policy which can only bring detriment to Po- 
land. Instead of abolishing the boundary of Jewish settle- 
ment in the east, and granting the Jews equal civic rights, 
Russia wants to expand the area of their settlement to the 
west in order to create artificially with the aid of Jews and 
Germans national strife on the Vistula, and be able to abolish 
under this pretext the promised autonomy. Russia wants to 
create Judeo-Poland and thus facilitate the final russification 
and destruction of Poland. 

In their attitude toward the Polish question, the Jews 
joined hands with Russia. "The Jewish press in the Polish 
provinces welcomed the Polish manifesto with almost hys- 
terical enthusiasm." The Jewish dailies in Warsaw said 
editorially that the Jews ''are deeply grateful to the Russian 
commander-in-chief because in his manifesto to the Poles 
he did not forget to mention the other nationalities whose 
fate is bound up with that of the Poles," and it is to be ex- 
pected ''that, in accordance with the manifesto, the Poles will 
respect the rights of the other nationalities within their pro- 
vinces."t Even in America, which was the centre of the 
anti-Russian-Jewish activity, a definite change can be ob- 
served. The same Jewish press, which a few years ago tried 
to influence the government to break off the commercial 



* "The Globe," New York, March i, 1915. 
t 'The Day," February 18, 1915. 



— 35 — 

treaties with Russia, is now elated by "Purishkewitsh, the 
Black Hundred Leader in the Duma, having kissed the scroll 
of Torah/'* They started in this war a general white- 
washing of Russia and a simultaneous slandering of Poland, 
intimating that "the pogrom policy abandoned by the Russian 
government was taken up in another form by the Poles !''f 
A whole machinery of slander and impudent lies was set in 
motion so as to finish up the unfortunate nation visited by 
all the calamities of the present war. 

With lies, however, one cannot go far. 

The note of the Jewish Bund proved beyond doubt that 
there were never any pogroms in Poland arranged by Poles. 
In December, 1914, Mr. Herman Bernstein publicly an- 
nounced that "the Poles resolved to methods of barbarism 
in their policy of Jew-hatred — their hands are smeared with 
the blood of the Jews in Poland ; a nation of pogrom-makers 
is unworthy of independence.''^ About a year afterward, 
when the same Mr. Bernstein returned from Europe, he 
ceased to speak about the ''Polish pogroms," and at the first 
interview when landing on the continent attested that "for 
their military defeat on the battlefield, the Russian authori- 
ties made military pogroms against their own peaceful Jew- 
ish population. ''§ The main argument that Poles instigated 
Russian soldiers to the pogroms is puerile and ludicrous. 
Russia having in her record Kishenieff, Siedlce and Bialy- 
stok does not need any instigation. In spite of that, the 
Jewish press does not stop flirting with Puriskewitsh, al- 
though the latter is a deputy from Kishenieff, and endeavors 
to direct public opinion against the independence of Poland. 



* "New York Sun," and "The Day," 2, 18, 1915. 

1 1. c, Bernstein Herman. 

t "The Day," December 13, 1914. 

§ "The New York Times," October 18, 191 5. 



— 36 — 

These are the facts which show plainly that the Jews aid the 
Russian project of solving the Polish question and try to 
subdue the independence of Poland. The Jews themselves 
do not believe in any change in Russia, and that is the reason 
why they would gladly welcome the expansion of their settle- 
ment in the westerly direction in Poland, remaining at the 
same time in connection with Russia. In the internal politics 
they would be certain of the German aid, because in Poland 
the Jews are always the vanguard of Germanism. As far as 
commerce is concerned, they calculate on the capture of the 
eastern markets in Asia. In the wake of the Russian sword, 
if the latter were capable of opening the gates of Constan- 
tinople, Jewish money would pour into China and India 
where it would displace the capital of the Western European 
nations and pave the way for the Russian army. Thus the 
Russian imperialism and the Jewish commercial expansion 
were brought close together in the present war. 

Poland was always friendly to Jews, especially the demo- 
cratic, aspiring Poland. In the insurrection- of 1863 the 
Jew, Wohl, was the treasurer of the national government, 
and the banker, Kronenberg, was one of the important per- 
sonages. Before the very outbreak of the uprising, when 
the Russian soldiers were shooting at the Polish church 
procession on the streets of Warsaw as it emerged from the 
cathedral of St. John, the cross which fell from the hands 
of a Pole shot dead by a Russian soldier was picked up by 
a Jew and the demonstration was led by a Jew. It was only 
due to Russian influence that the friendly relations between 
Poles and Jews were brought to an end. Russophilism and 
antisemitism in Poland are but two aspects of the same thing. 
Roman Dmowski, who in the present war was the main- 
spring of the Russophilic committee, was, before the war, 
the leader of the antisemitic movement. The attitude of the 



— 37 — 

Jews toward the Polish cause proved to be identical with 
that of the Russophilic antisemites in Warsaw. Democratic 
Poland fighting for her liberty is just as Anti-Russian 
as it is not, and never was, antisemitic. This question has 
been sifted during the present war by Prof. Dr. W. L. 
Jaworski, the president of the Polish Supreme National 
Committee : 

"Antisemitism, no matter in what form it would appear, 
might bring only an injury to our national interests. The 
shortcomings of the Polish commerce and industry can 
neither be removed by antisemitism nor by national dem- 
agogism; they could be removed only by wide reforms that 
would enable them to establish better hygiene of the inner 
social and economic relations in general; that would raise 
the standard of culture among the wide masses, and that 
would ofifer new openings for new fields in industry and for 
general development. 

''Only frank and decided declaration that regenerated 
Poland would not maintain the policy of antisemitism, the 
policy of chicanery and persecution, might help to make 
Jews better citizens on one hand, and on the other hand it 
would check the wide anti- Polish crusade carried on now by 
Jews abroad. Leaving Russia and turning to Western 
Europe, Poland must follow the example given by the coun- 
tries of Western Europe in solving the Jewish question, 
namely, Poland must gain sympathy of Jews by granting 
them equal rights of citizens. At the same time, we must 
emphatically demand of Jews that they become the true 
citizens of the country — that they act for the interest of the 
country, and work for her development. This end could be 
secured only by giving the Jews in Poland access to the 
sources of welfare and culture. As in Western Europe, 
Jews have become either good Frenchmen, Englishmen, 



— 38 — 

Italians or Germans, so we have the right, too, to demand of 
our Polish Jews to become good Poles and be real good 
citizens of Poland/' 

Poland cannot and will not recognize any hyphenated 
Poles ! 

For the sake of historical accuracy, I take the liberty to 
assert that the attack of the Jewish press on Poland, not only 
here in America, but also all over the world, was made sud- 
denly and without any endeavor on the part of the Jews to 
come to an understanding with the Polish Supreme Na- 
tional Committee regarding the policy of future Poland on 
the Jewish question. The enmity of the Jews against the 
Poles plainly manifested itself in this country of free speecli 
and free press, by the failure to insert vindications of the 
Poles against a wave of calumnies thrown at the Polish na- 
tion, the first step being made by George Brandes, who wrote 
an open and most unjust letter. Jewish nationalists were 
very well aware of the fact that Poland, not being anti- 
Semitic in general as a nation, must, however, be anti- 
zionistic when the zionism or Jewish nationalism endeavors 
with Russian or German aid to create the Judeo-Poland. 

Those who think that the Jewish question in Poland means 
an antagonism against the Jews are grossly mistaken. It is 
something entirely different, inasmuch as the war made on 
the Polish nation by the Jewish nationalistic party all over 
the world tends to obtain for the Jews in Poland not the 
rights of equal citizenship, but a recognition of a distinct na- 
tional franchise in order to make of Poland a country of 
mixed nationality and thus to create, with the help of Russia, 
a precedent for the revision of the entire Jewish question in 
Europe and possibly also in America in the near future. The 
following quotation may serve as an illustration: *Tn order 
that Jews may be assured of equality in civil and political 



— 39 — 

life it is essential that they be accorded recognition as a na- 
tional group in Poland," and "it is hardly probable that any 
sensible Jew will object to the Jewish demand for equal 
recognition with the Ruthenians, the Czechs, the Slavs of 
the Austrian Empire."* 

The attitude of the whole world toward the Jewish ques- 
tion can be expressed by the formula of the French revolu- 
tion: *^The Jews as a nation should be deprived of every- 
thing, but the Jews as men should be assured of every- 
thing."f This is the principle of equal civic rights for Jews 
without granting them separate national rights. Contrary to 
this, the Jews demand in future Poland equal recognition for 
their jargon as a national tongue. Even Western Europe 
has not as yet grown up to the national concubinage, and 
Poland is still less ready to outdo the whole world in the 
Jewish question. Jewish nationalism does not lie within the 
practical political demands. Natura non facit saltus. The 
development of democracy in Europe must at first separate 
the idea of national consciousness from the idea of owning 
the soil. Only then will it be possible for a nation to exist 
within a nation. At present the whole world stands on the 
basis of the principle of the French revolution, and Poland, 
being in the throes of this terrible war, cannot indulge in 
risky experiments. 

Russia understands that in case of her eventual victory 
over the Germans, there will come a time when the Germans 
will start the war of retaliation — no matter what key Russia is 
going to use in making the frontiers of the "United Poland." 
Both the ethnographical and the historical keys bring Russia 
closer to Berlin. The victory of Russia would not weaken 
Germany as much as it would weaken Prussia within the 

* "Dos Yidische Folk," New York, November 12, 1915. 
t Clermon Tonners, 21, 12, 1789, in the National Assembly. 



— 40 — 

German empire. Prussia cannot submit to this weakening 
for any length of time and she will not lack means and 
cleverness to draw the German empire into her plans of 
revenge. Russia must take into account that the German war 
of revenge in the east will have the support of England, 
since England is the enemy of German ambitions on the sea 
and in colonial enterprises, but she is not Germany's rival on 
land, and especially not in Eastern Europe. England, after 
having defeated Germany on the sea, and having ousted the 
Germans from Belgium, will gladly attack the victorious 
Russia with German hands on the first occasion, so as not 
to permit the excessive overgrowth of Russia. These are 
the factors which guide Russia's policy in Poland in the 
present war. Russia must, due to her aggressive traditions, 
gravitate toward the Oder, and the road to the Oder leads 
over the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. This 
tendency is couched in Russian diplomatic language in the 
phrase — ''Uniting Poland under the sceptre of the Czar." 
In reality it means the securing of her eventual western 
frontiers, in order to make the best use of her numerical 
superiority in the future inevitable retaliatory war with 
Germany and Austria. Politically the Russian plan tries to 
poison Poland with an excess of Germans and Jews, which 
process would facilitate the digestion of the occupied terri- 
tories and absolute conquest of the Vistula. 

The game has been going on for a year. 

There was no greater strategical mistake on the part of 
Russia than her victory over Hindenburg at Warsaw. Hin- 
denburg's offensive was merely a strategical provocation to 
draw the centrum of the Russian army to the left bank 
of the Vistula, and then to threaten with flank attacks both 
Russian wings, and not permitting any movement westward 
for fear of losing the lines of communication. The defence 



— 41 — 

of Warsaw was the beginning of the defeat of Russia on the 
Vistula. The paradox of the Vistula, Austria holding the 
upper course, Russia the middle, and Germany the lower, 
proved its inherent danger. The strategical road toward the 
west does not run through Warsaw so long as Cracow and 
Danzig do not belong to the aggressor. Dragomirow, Hurko 
and Kuropatkin were right in advising Russia to follow 
Kutuzow's plan which originated in his combat with Napo- 
leon. With the Mazurian Lakes in the north and the Car- 
pathian passes in the south, endangering both wings of the 
Russian army, Russia cannot attack successfully either 
Vienna or Berlin. The Russian offensive movement through 
Warsaw forces the Russian army to assume an arched posi- 
tion, with the center directed toward the west and both 
flanks running backwards, one along the Mazurian Lakes 
and the other along the Carpathian Mountains. Such a 
strategical position is synonymous with defeat. With Poland 
divided into three parts and the strategical difficulty of the 
Vistula created thereby, the only way for Russia to victory 
is to follow Kutuzow's method and retire beyond the Niemen 
and Bug rivers. Strategically it means the evacuation of 
Russian-Poland in the first period of the war. Politically it 
signifies the superfluity of Russian-Poland for Russia. The 
Russian rule over Poland has no political, no historical, no 
moral basis, not even a strategical one. For Poland it means 
injury, for Russia it means an unnecessary burden of false 
imperialism. History administered justice to Russia by her 
terrible defeat, and gave her warning for the future. Only 
an independent Poland can solve easily the strategical diffi- 
culty of the Vistula. 

The independence of Poland has not only a historical 
foundation, but also a strategical one. The partition of 
Poland renders the Russian offensive westward impossible. 



— 42 — 

In the present condition of Poland, the road to Vienna or 
BerHn does not lead through Warsaw; on the contrary, 
Austria-Hungary and Germany dominate the Russian line of 
fortresses of Warsaw, Deblin* and Modlin,*)* as long as they 
possess the Mazurian Lakes and the Carpathian Mountains, 
while the road toward the east is open for them. This is the 
fundamental contrast in the strategical interests of Germany 
and Austria on one side, and Russia on the other. This 
contrast can only be removed by the independence of Poland. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Poland will be 
restored after the present war. In the future war of retalia- 
tion, Poland by the power of her existence only will defend 
Russia against an out-flanking movement from the side of 
the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. Poland 
remaining neutral, the territory about the middle of the 
Vistula cannot be made the field of military operations. It 
is hardly conceivable, however, that Poland could stay neu- 
tral in such a war. It will be the war for the possession of 
the Vistula line! If we assume that Poland would turn 
against Russia, then the line of conflict will be formed by 
the rivers Niemen, Bug and Dniester. In other words, Rus- 
sia will be free from danger of flank attacks upon her wings 
and will have the possibility of the frontal attack in the 
westerly direction. In case Poland would turn against 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, Warsaw would be in danger 
of a flanking attack from the side of the Mazurian Lakes 
and Carpathian Mountains, which fact equalizes in favor of 
Germany and Austria the numerical superiority of Russia. 
The new partition of Poland between Austria and Germany 
will deprive them of the possibility of the flanking move- 
ment, since it will not restore Poland but only remove Russia 

* Ivangorod. 

t Novo-Georgievsk. 



— 43 — 

from Warsaw. This will only be favorable for Russia, 
since it will facilitate her eventual frontal attack on the 
whole line, leaving her flanks secure in a good strategical 
position. Only the neutrality of independent Poland may 
be a factor for insuring a permanent peace, since it will 
render difficult the Russian offensive toward the west, as 
well as that of Austria and Germany toward the east. Be- 
sides this, a line of Polish fortresses on the Niemen, Bug 
and Dniester would also materially assist in guaranteeing 
peace. 

There is a difference in power a free nation can display 
from that of an enslaved nation. The free and independent 
Poland will soon become the center of Slavic creative power 
in harmony with the interests of Western Europe, and with- 
out political Russophilism. Poland even now neutralizes 
the Russian influence in the Slavic world, since she is an 
older historical unit than Russia. The Balkan states are 
free, but^ their civilization is inferior to that of Russia and 
that is why the Balkans are such favorable soil for Russian 
political propaganda. The equilibrium of Europe can only 
be maintained by the division of the Slavic world. In War- 
saw, the Roman cross and the traditions of Rome ; in Mos- 
cow, and on the Dnieper, the cross and the traditions of 
Constantinople. This does not mean the separation of two 
religious systems only. Two different cultures, sympathies, 
arts, and finally, two different forms of political law should 
be separated from each other. Constantinople was the 
breeding place of the Caesarian despotism; Rome, on the 
other side, due to the strife between the Papacy and the 
Roman emperors, was the source of the emancipation of 
states and nations and in the last instance of the citizen. All 
these factors constitute the boundary line between the civil- 
ization of. Western Europe and that of Russia. Poland al- 



— 44 — 

ways was the vanguard of the west. Poland was the father- 
land of Copernicus, "who stopped the sun in its course." 
The investigation of Birkenmajer in the archives of Stock- 
holm settled finally the nationality of Copernicus in favor 
of Poland.* The system of Copernicus forms the basis of 
the modern conception of the universe. If it had not been 
for Copernicus, Newton could not have accomplished his 
work or he would have to be Copernicus first. The physics 
of Gallileo is also the echo of the work of Copernicus. Po- 
land had no freedom for the last hundred years. Oppres- 
sion restrained the Polish schools and made it very difficult 
for the Polish nation to participate in the great work of 
civilization. Illiteracy and misery are set loose in Poland 
and have all the prospects of unlimited development which 
is denied to science and enterprise. Poland is not permitted 
to study and work. Such is the curse of life in slavery! 
The Polish creative genius could not, however, be sup- 
pressed. Chopin's music and Mickiewicz's poetry already 
after the downfall of Poland became the common* spiritual 
good of the whole world. Sienkiewicz and Curie-Sklodowski 
won Nobel prizes. In the scientific circles of the world 
are known the names of Smoluchowski, Raciborski, March- 
lewski, Godlewski, Morozewicz, Romer, Abramowski, Roz- 
wadowski, Zaremba, Olszewski, Kostanecki, Ochorowicz, 
and numerous others. That is the achievement of a nation 
of 20,000,000 people and possessing but two universities, 
one in Cracow and one in Lemberg. As soon as the Russian 
army occupied Lemberg, one of the first steps taken was the 
closing of the Polish University. Warsaw, a Western Euro- 
pean city in the real sense of the word, in tradition and cul- 
ture, a city numbering about 1,000,000 inhabitants, the 
capital city of 20,000,000 people, having a glorious and great 

* Expedition of Cracow's Academy of Sciences. 



— 45 — 

history, did not possess a university ! This was a fact which 
humiliated western civilization, and for this civilization in 
general has to be thankful to Russia, which proclaimed in 
this way the "Slavic Brotherhood" on the Vistula. Liberty 
will stimulate the Polish genius and this will enrich the world 
with new elements, and the Polish nation will regain the 
power to ''play the part in Europe to which it is entitled by 
its numbers, its culture, and its genius/'* 

The Congress of Vienna recognized and based its work 
upon the principle of legitimism. It was the conservative idea 
contrary to all the achievements of the Napoleonic era. 
Legitimism did not recognize the will of the nation ; it sup- 
ported legitimate authority, especially monarchy, on the 
grounds of hereditary rights. Belgium was returned to the 
Netherlands, the principality of Warsaw was annihilated, 
and Italy redivided. This cast the seeds for the revolution 
in Belgium, and the still more sanguine uprising in Poland. 
Italy had to have her Garibaldi. May the future peace con- 
gress not repeat the mistakes of the Congress in Vienna! 
Russia still to-day does not recognize the rights of nations 
in practice, placing the race above the rights of a nation, a 
principle very much inferior to the principle of legitimism. 
To Poland Russia promises autonomy in internal adminis- 
tration. This is less than the Congress of Vienna did, and 
which transformed the principality of Warsaw into a state 
within a state and did not only make an autonomic province 
of it. Poland hopes that if ever a future congress should 
not make it a sovereign state, it will at least deal with her 
according to the Vienna treaties, and will not allow ap- 
proaching the Polish problem on the basis of the manifesto 
of Duke Nikolas. The Congress of Vienna, although taking 

*"The Manchester Guardian/* 19, 12, 1915. — "The New Poland/' 
by Bruce Boswell, of Liverpool University. 



— 46 — 

the principle of legitimism as the point of issue, granted 
Poland the character of a state within a state; a separate 
diet, an army, it obliged the Russian Czar to crown himself 
Polish King in Warsaw. Will the future congress, which 
will assemble under the banner of freedom for nations, have 
the courage to step below this principle when dealing with 
the Polish question? 

The attitude of Poles as a nation devoid of political liberty 
was determined by real facts and not by sympathies : 

I. — Administrative and legislative autonomy existed in 
Galicia while Russian and German Poland did not 
enjoy these advantages. 
II. — Private military schools could only be established 
in Galicia. Consequently, Polish youths from 
Russian and Prussian-Poland went to Galicia 
since in the former two provinces any military 
work had to be secretly carried on, and, conse- 
quently, not very effectively. The beginning of 
this political system dates back to the years 1876-8, 
when with the unofficial aid of England an up- 
rising against Russia, in alliance with Austro- 
Hungary, was organized. 
III. — Only in Russian-Poland, on the left bank of the 
Vistula, were there enough recruits for the Polish 
military representation in the case of European 
war, since Russia had, for strategical reasons, to 
evacuate the western governments of Russian 
Poland with the outbreak of the war, and this 
prevented the Russian authorities to mobilize in 
the mining and industrial districts of Russian- 
Poland. 
IV. — During the Congress of Vienna, one hundred 
years ago, England entered into a secret treaty 



— 47 — 

with France and Austria against Russia, in spite 
of the fact that Russia was a faithful ally of Eng- 
land in her war against Napoleon. 
V. — At the Congress in Vienna, England supported the 
Polish interests against Russia, although the Pol- 
ish regiments were fighting with Napoleon against 
England. 
VI. — Poland wanted and could form a military repre- 
sentation only against Russia and in alliance with 
Austria-Hungary. That it was practicable was 
proven by the development of the Polish legions 
in Cracow and an absolute failure of Russian en- 
deavors in Warsaw to form a competitory legion. 
VII. — Russia occupies 80 per cent, of the historical 
Polish territory, and Warsaw is the capital city 
of Poland. Under these conditions the war of 
Austria with Prussia in 1866 could not, and did 
not revive the Polish question, but the possibility 
of war between Austria and Russia was always 
and must always be associated with the prepara- 
tion of the Polish uprising against Russia and 
in alliance with Austria-Hungary. 
VIII. — The military interests in the present war do not 
coincide with the political interests, consequently 
the formation of the Polish legions against Rus- 
sia, and in alliance with Austria-Hungary, does 
not free any one from the obligation of supporting 
the Polish independence. 
Poland went along the way of her ratio status and of 
practical possibilities. She could not forget for a moment 
that Warsaw is not Antwerp, and that Warsaw is not located 
in front of London on the other side of the Channel. Eng- 
land must fight in order to support Belgium, but England 



— 48 — 

may limit the support of the PoHsh question to the war on 
paper. The PoHsh uprising in 1830 broke out when Czar 
Nikolas I, in the name of the reactionary principle of legit- 
imism, wanted to send the Polish army to Belgium in order 
to crush her struggle for independence. That did not in- 
fluence England in the following year to save Warsaw from 
the Russian superior forces, although it was Warsaw which 
saved Belgium. The blood of the Polish heroes of the upris- 
ing of 1863 created nothing more than sympathy in Western 
Europe. The Congress of Vienna obliged not only Russia 
but also Prussia to respect the rights of the Polish nation. 
Prussia at the time of Bismarck adopted the anti-Polish 
policy in the Province of Posen. Bismarck did not like the 
sea, so England preferred to keep quiet and to forget diplo- 
matically the treaty of Vienna. On November 9, 1896, a 
Prussian order was issued, changing the Polish flag of the 
Province of Posen and substituting it with the Prussian 
colors. On February 10, 1897, Minister Von der Recke 
made a brutal speech in the Prussian diet defending the 
above order. England remained silent; still worse, she 
preferred to terrorize France in her Fashoda dispute, instead 
of claiming of Berlin the observance of the treaties of 
Vienna concerning the Polish rights. England did not for- 
get her treaties with Belgium, but alas, how soon she did 
forget those concerning the Polish cause. Nobody enters 
war for someone else's pleasure ; nobody sheds the blood of 
his nation for the other people's interests only. Such is the 
logic and truth of history. Poland understands it, but she 
wants also other nations to understand her position. If 
those, who in the present war proclaimed the watchword of 
the independence of nations, are sincere, Poland hopes that 
the future peace congress will adopt one of two alternatives : 



— 49 — 

I. — Either absolute independence of Poland, or 
11. — Restoration of Poland as a state within another 
state. 

Both alternatives prohibit the submittance of Polish ter- 
ritory to another dismemberment. 

The union of the Polish provinces under the sceptre of 
the Czar, and on the basis of the manifesto of the Grand 
Duke Nikolas, will be, in spite of all appearances, only an 
injustice to Poland. A Polish state within a federation of 
German states would be an anomaly. A Polish state in 
union with Austria-Hungary on the basis of a triple union 
would be a favorable solution of the problem. But happi- 
ness and full justice can only be brought about by absolute 
independence, since this form of political existence was lost 
by Poland due to the ''crime'' of the partition."^ 

The hurricane of war which at present envelops Warsaw 
with the cloud of smoke rising from the battlefields, and 
with rivers of blood spilled in the greatest war of the ages 
will give birth to Poland's future. And above this blood- 
soaked soil of Poland the Polish legions unfurled their ban- 
ner of Red and White, and await the help of all nations 
having the good will to help. 



* Clemenceau. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ^ j 

019 912 313 



